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Abstract
The authors contrast the impact of two sources of information ﬂow on the volatility of prices,
trading activity, and liquidity in the brokered interdealer market for Government of Canada bonds.
Liquidity varies with the amount of asymmetric information in the market, and order ﬂow plays a
central role in the processing of information. The authors ﬁnd a two-stage adjustment process in
the period before and after a scheduled 8:30 a.m. macroeconomic news announcement that is
similar to the adjustment process documented by Fleming and Remolona (1999) for the U.S.
Treasury market. They contrast these dynamics with the adjustment that occurs around a
Government of Canada bond auction. Results are somewhat inconsistent with the patterns
observed around macroeconomic news events, but are explained by theory.
JEL classiﬁcation: G14
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; Market structure and pricing; Debt management
Résumé
Les auteurs comparent l’incidence qu’ont les informations provenant de deux sources distinctes
sur la volatilité des cours, l’activité et la liquidité dans le marché du courtage intermédiaire
d’obligations du gouvernement canadien. La liquidité varie selon le degré d’asymétrie de
l’information sur le marché, et les ﬂux d’ordres jouent un rôle central dans le traitement de
l’information. Les auteurs constatent qu’un processus d’ajustement en deux étapes a lieu durant la
période qui précède et qui suit l’annonce prévue, à 8 h 30, d’une nouvelle macroéconomique, et
que ce processus s’apparente à celui que décrivent Fleming et Remolona (1999) relativement au
marché des titres du Trésor américain. Ils comparent cette dynamique avec l’ajustement qui
s’opère avant et après les adjudications d’obligations du gouvernement canadien. Les résultats ne
cadrent pas tout à fait avec les tendances observées lors de la publication de nouvelles
macroéconomiques, mais ils trouvent leur explication dans la théorie.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G14
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Structure de marché et ﬁxation des prix;
Gestion de la dette1
1. Introduction
Efﬁcient and liquid government securities markets are often viewed as important to a country’s
economic well-being because they perform a number of key functions. For example, given their
virtually default-free nature, government securities are used as benchmarks for the pricing and
hedging of other ﬁxed-income securities. In addition, market participants use government
securities to speculate on the course of interest rates, because they can buy and sell the securities
quickly and with minimal transaction costs. One important feature of government debt markets is
the extent to which they are driven by public news, and, in particular, macroeconomic news. The
information in scheduled macroeconomic news releases is scrutinized by the market, whose
participants seek to determine the future cost of capital. News releases, such as those associated
with changes in employment, retail sales, and the consumer price index (CPI), have been found to
affect the term structure of interest rates.1
It could take some time before news is fully reﬂected in prices and yields if investors have
differing abilities (e.g., different models and experience) in processing information, or if they
have different interpretations of the news. One way in which markets process information is by
observing order ﬂow, sometimes quantiﬁed as buyer- less seller-initiated trades. Dealers, who
supply liquidity in government securities markets by executing transactions against their own
inventory of bonds, observe part of the overall order ﬂow in the market. Order ﬂow reﬂects
dispersed information on participants’ expectations about future fundamentals, and their
interpretation of macroeconomic news. Consequently, dealers will initiate trades when their
private bond valuations, conditioned on their private order-ﬂow information, differ from market
prices.
Macroeconomic news announcements are not the only direct source of information that affects
prices and yields in government securities markets. Brandt and Kavajecz (2002) ﬁnd evidence that
a large part of the variability in yields occurs outside the release of public information.
Speciﬁcally, order ﬂow is important because it aggregates the information in trades. Trades
contain little bits of information about fundamentals in the economy, including information about
the cost of capital.2 It is important to recognize that individual traders may not consider
themselves to have superior information. But if their trades are correlated with macroeconomic
variables, then the order ﬂow collected by dealers conveys incremental information about the
1. See Gravelle and Moessner (2001) for details on which macroeconomic news releases in Canada and
the United States affectinterest rates.
2. Evans and Lyons (2004) examine how information from the real side of the economy is aggregated
through trades in a dynamic general-equilibrium model.2
economy. If dealers use order-ﬂow information in their speculative and hedging decisions, it will
eventually be incorporated into prices and yields. Brandt and Kavajecz (2002) ﬁnd order-ﬂow
imbalances account for up to 21 per cent of the day-to-day variation in yields on days without
major macroeconomic announcements. We focus on how government securities markets behave
as information is released and processed.
Making use of high-frequency data, we examine the role of information in government securities
markets by exploring the impact that Canadian and U.S. macroeconomic news announcements,
and the release of the results of a Government of Canada bond auction, have on trading activity,
price volatility, and liquidity in secondary markets. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to
contrast price and trade dynamics around bond auctions and macroeconomic news releases.
The capture of trade and quote information during the period surrounding a government securities
auction gives us a unique opportunity to analyze how order ﬂow unrelated to macroeconomic
news releases is processed by the market. In the Government of Canada primary market,
government securities dealers bid for themselves and submit bids on behalf of their clients. The
bids of a dealer’s clients are received over a short amount of time, and are the dealer’s private
information. They reﬂect part of the overall order ﬂow in the market. An understanding of price
and trade dynamics around the auction will in turn afford an understanding of how the market
behaves over longer periods of time as order-ﬂow information unrelated to macroeconomic news
is revealed.
The type of information revealed around a bond auction differs from that of a macroeconomic
news announcement, and should have a different impact on price levels. In this paper, we are not
concerned with the overall change in prices subsequent to a news release, but the behaviour of
prices and trades before and after the release. The pattern in prices and trades that we attempt to
uncover will depend in part on how private information is revealed in the market. Market
participants will form an expectation about a macroeconomic news announcement prior to its
release. Expectations will reﬂect the participants’ own models and the analysis of other
participants who monitor and analyze the economy. Private information exists prior to the release
if participants believe that they have a superior forecast, and if they want to keep their forecasts
private in the hope of trading on their differential view.
The actual macroeconomic news announcement is public information that affects prices before
anyone can trade on it. After the announcement is made, private information may again exist if
participants differ on how to interpret the macroeconomic news. Green (2004) ﬁnds that
information asymmetry rises in the wake of an important macroeconomic news announcement.3
Over time, private information in the market will dissipate once it is reﬂected in trades and order
ﬂow, and then subsequently in prices.
In comparison, before the results of a securities auction are released, dealers will have private
information about its results if they have participated in the auction either on their own behalf or
on behalf of their clients. Once the results of the auction are released, there is little scope for
private information about prices or yields. In this paper, we attempt to characterize the behaviour
of prices and trades around these two types of news releases. An event-study approach is used
because standard time-series techniques are not well suited. In particular, a controlled experiment
can be performed by comparing dynamics on days with and without a release.3
The measurement and tracking of liquidity is relevant to those who transact in the market. A
liquid ﬁnancial market is one where participants can rapidly execute large transactions with only a
small impact on prices.4 Traditional market microstructure models predict that liquidity will
deteriorate around the release of an information event and return to normal afterwards.5 Kim and
Verrecchia (1994) argue that, if informed traders possess an informational advantage after an
event, liquidity will remain low as long as the informed traders maintain their interpretation
advantage. Volatility may also increase temporarily as investors adjust their beliefs. After an
adjustment period, liquidity will revert to normal, and volatility will subside. This may coincide
with a period of abnormally high trading activity as traders rebalance their portfolios. Given the
many dimensions of liquidity, we use a number of measures to calculate it.
Why should we care about liquidity in government securities markets? Research has indicated
that market liquidity has a positive, ﬁrst-order impact on asset returns (e.g., Amihud, Mendelson,
and Lauterbach 1997). Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath (2003) explore liquidity by comparing ﬁxed-
income securities that differ only in whether they are “on-the-run” or “off-the-run.” They ﬁnd that
more-liquid securities are priced higher, but the difference depends on the amount of expected
future liquidity over its remaining lifetime, rather than just its current liquidity. Ellul and Pagano
(2002) focus on liquidity to shed light on a long-standing puzzle in the ﬁnance literature. They
ﬁnd that underpricing of initial public offerings in the equity market can be explained by taking
into account investors’ expectations of future liquidity, and by the uncertainty about the level of
3. MacKinlay (1997) provides a survey of the event studymethodology.
4. Marketliquiditycanbedeﬁnedacrossfourdimensions:immediacy,depth,width(bid/askspread),and
resiliency. Immediacy refers to the speed with which a trade of a given size at a given cost is
completed.Depthreferstothemaximalsizeofatradeforanygivenbid/askspread.Widthreferstothe
costsofprovidingliquidity.Resiliencyreferstohowquicklypricesreverttooriginal(orfundamental)
levels after a large transaction.
5. See Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) and O’Hara(1995).4
liquidity when shares start trading on the market. The less liquid shares are expected to be and the
less predictable their liquidity, the larger will be the required underpricing. Findings suggest that
expected aftermarket liquidity and liquidity risk are important determinants of initial public
offering (IPO) underpricing. Around the world, government debt managers are keen to foster
liquidity to minimize the cost of public funds.
Studies of intraday conditions in the U.S. Treasury market have revealed a great deal about its
quality.6 In particular, the studies have sought to measure the average level of liquidity in the
market, characterize how liquidity changes over time and in periods of stress, and examine how
the government yield curve adjusts to new information. Overall, the results of the studies suggest
that the U.S. Treasury market is extremely liquid, and that it incorporates relevant news into prices
and yields nearly instantaneously.
Fleming and Remolona (1999, henceforth referred to as F&R) ﬁnd that U.S. Treasury markets
react to public macroeconomic information with a sharp reduction in liquidity combined with
rapid price changes as information is absorbed, and then a subsequent surge in trading activity as
participants trade on their differing views regarding the interpretation of the new information.
Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) also investigate the effects of scheduled macroeconomic
announcements on liquidity using U.S. Treasury data. Using a larger set of new announcements,
their results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of F&R. They ﬁnd that, in the aftermath of an announcement,
there is a signiﬁcant and persistent increase in volatility and trading volume, and that bid/ask
spreads widen at the time of the announcement but then revert to normal after 5 to 15 minutes.
The widening of the bid/ask spreads for up to 15 minutes after the announcement suggests that,
during a second phase, both the increased levels of volatility and volume are partly driven by
informed trading.
It may be tempting to assume that Canadian government securities markets behave in a
comparable manner, given the similar trading structure in the two markets. Most importantly,
trading in both markets takes place in a continuous, over-the-counter, competitive multidealer
market.7 Such an assumption may not be wise. One important difference is the size of the U.S.
Treasury market. It dwarfs Canada’s both in terms of the value of securities outstanding and
average trading volumes. The outstanding value of marketable debt issued in the Government of
Canada securities and U.S. Treasury market at the end of December 2003 was $373 billion and
6. Forexample:Babbeletal.(2003),Balduzzi,Elton,andGreen(2001),BoniandLeach(2002),Brandt
and Kavajecz (2002), Cohen and Shin (2003), Fleming (1997, 2002, 2003), Fleming and Remolona
(1999), Fleming and Sarkar (1999), Furﬁne and Remolona (2001), Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath
(2003), and Green (2004).
7. Gravelle (1999) provides a detailed discussion of the similarities and differences in the two markets.5
$3,399 billion, respectively.8 Even more bewildering, average daily trading volumes for Canadian
and U.S. marketable government securities was $22.4 and $433.5 billion, respectively, in 2003.9
Differences in the size of the markets themselves may be a factor generating differences in
liquidity dynamics. Furthermore, a whole set of other factors—such as the number, or
concentration, of government securities dealers, the method in which securities are auctioned, or
even the amount of capital dealing ﬁnancial institutions allocate to managing U.S. Treasuries and
Government of Canada securities risk—necessitate a separate and detailed analysis of how
Canadian government securities markets behave.
This paper extends the existing literature by investigating the high-frequency market conditions
that surround macroeconomic news releases and government securities auctions. We do not
explicitly analyze the price-discovery process of government bond markets. In particular, our
analysis is not aimed at evaluating competing models of interest rate determination by examining
the effects of news on yields. We focus on measuring liquidity surrounding macroeconomic news
announcements and government bond auctions. The effects that scheduled macroeconomic news
releases and securities auctions have on price volatility, bid/ask spreads, trading volumes, trade
and quote activity, proportion of trades that undergo expansion, and price-impact coefﬁcients are
documented. Trades often go through an expansion process in which a broker mediates an
increase in trade size beyond the amount quoted. The price-impact coefﬁcient measures how
much prices adjust to trades, or, more speciﬁcally, to order ﬂow. Price-impact coefﬁcients can be
used to characterize liquidity because liquid markets accommodate trades with the least impact on
prices. Our empirical analysis focuses on the benchmark (or on-the-run) 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year
Government of Canada notes. We examine anonymous interdealer trades conducted through
brokers.
In the case of 8:30 a.m. macroeconomic news announcements, we observe a two-stage adjustment
to public information that is consistent with both dealer inventory control and asymmetric
information interpretations of market liquidity, and similar to the ﬁndings by F&R. In the ﬁrst
stage, the 5-minute intervals before and after an announcement, bid/ask spreads widen and trading
activity increases moderately. In an extended second stage, price volatility, trading volumes, and
trade and quote activity increase to higher-than-normal levels following an 8:30 a.m.
macroeconomic release, with signiﬁcant effects persisting in some cases up to half an hour
following the event. We also document a third stage: after an hour, we observe a surge in liquidity
as price-impact coefﬁcients fall dramatically. Enough time may have elapsed that little private
8. Par value of total bonds and treasury bills, notincluding Real Return Bonds.
9. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Investment Dealers Association of Canada. The data
exclude repos.6
information is left in the market, providing an opportunity for uninformed traders to rebalance
their portfolios. Overall, the trade and price dynamics that we document suggest that the Canadian
government securities market reacts to macroeconomic news in a manner that is consistent with
theoretical predictions and U.S. evidence.
We ﬁnd that periods that precede government bond auction cut-off times are associated with
higher-than-normal trade and quote activity and volumes, and lower bid/ask spreads for each of
the benchmark bonds. While bid/ask spreads widen in the period immediately before and after the
release of the auction results, volatility falls. In a second stage, trading volumes, trade and quote
frequencies, and price-impact coefﬁcients are all larger than normal, because investors adjust their
beliefs with information from the auction results. These results are somewhat inconsistent with
the patterns observed around macroeconomic news events, but are explained by theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some institutional
characteristics of the Government of Canada securities market. Theoretical predictions of market
microstructure models are laid out formally in section 3. Sections 4, 5, and 6 describe the events
and transaction-level data, the liquidity measures, and our statistical methodology, respectively.
Section 7 discusses the results of the paper, and how they compare with those of Fleming and
Remolona (1999) and theoretical predictions. Section 8 concludes. An appendix provides details
on the statistical tests utilized in the paper.
2. The Government of Canada Securities Market
The market for Government of Canada securities is the largest ﬁxed-income market in Canada,
with some $256 billion in bonds10 and $117 billion in treasury bills outstanding as of December
2003. Like most sovereign securities markets, the market for Government of Canada securities is
primarily a wholesale, institutional market, where a number of professional participants11 conduct
very large trades, often in excess of $25 or $50 million, on a relatively infrequent basis. The
market is generally described as being divided into the primary market, where Government of
Canada securities are sold through auctions, and the secondary market.
In the primary market, the Bank of Canada conducts regular auctions of securities on behalf of the
Department of Finance according to a pre-announced calendar. A group of dealers known as
government securities dealers (GSDs) is granted direct access to bid in discriminatory price
10. Par value, not including Real Return Bonds.
11. Professional participants include securities dealers, pension funds, investment managers, insurance
companies, and mutual funds.7
auctions. One key difference between GSDs and customers in the auction is that GSDs submit
bids on their account, whereas customers participate by submitting their bids through one or more
GSDs.
Over the past decade, the government has supported large benchmark issues, a regular and
transparent issuance calendar for 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year bonds, and common coupon payment
dates. The target sizes of these benchmark issues have been increased to improve the liquidity of
each issue. To increase the depth of the market, the Department of Finance and the Bank of
Canada auction off the same bond repeatedly. This implies that a bond does not achieve its so-
called “on-the-run” liquidity status as the most liquid security in its maturity class until its
accumulated size nears that of the old benchmark (usually on its second-to-last or last reopening).
A time schedule of the auctions is provided to the public at the beginning of the year so that
market participants know in advance whether and when the bond on auction will be reopened.
The resale market for government securities is referred to as the secondary market. Most
transactions take place between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. Dealers in the market, usually representing
ﬁnancial institutions, commit themselves to trade continuously in the market by posting a bid and
an ask price for each government security. The secondary market can be decomposed into two
markets: the interdealer market and the customer-dealer market. In the customer-dealer market,
institutional investors trade with dealers on a bilateral over-the-counter basis over the telephone,
with the result of these transactions known only to the two counterparties who participate in the
transaction.12 The interdealer market operates partially on a direct bilateral over-the-counter basis
and partially through electronic interdealer brokers (IDBs).
The current Canadian IDBs are screen-based voice brokers that allow dealers to trade
anonymously with each other. Each participant has a screen where bids, offers, and trade
outcomes are posted. Participants post quotes and make trades by communicating with the broker
over the telephone. Given the large and unpredictable inventory shocks typically faced by dealers
in their trades with customers, interdealer debt markets have developed to facilitate inventory
management and risk sharing. Whereas only dealers can post quotes or trade through the IDBs,
both customers and dealers have viewing access to an IDB’s electronic screens. The introduction
of IDBs has signiﬁcantly reduced the role of bilateral interdealer trading in recent years.
The level of transparency in the IDB market was enhanced on 20 August 2001 with the
introduction of CanPX,13 a data service that consolidates and disseminates to interested
12. More recently, electronic platforms have been introduced in Canada that offer simultaneous multiple-
dealer quote inquiries and trading inone case, and peer-to-peer, order-driven trading in another.
13. Zorn (2004) elaborates on recent discussions between regulators, academics, and market participants
associated with the issue of transparency and regulationin Canadian ﬁxed-income markets.8
subscribers anonymous trade and quote data submitted by Canada’s ﬁxed-income IDBs. Based on
dealer statistics reported to the Investment Dealers Association (IDA), the Canadian interdealer
debt market represented approximately 46 per cent of the total secondary Government of Canada
bond market trading volume during 2002, of which IDB trading accounted for 86 per cent (up
from 50 per cent in 1991 and 75 per cent in 1997). This is comparable to the U.S. Treasury
market, where the interdealer market accounted for 50 per cent of activity in 1997, of which
trading on IDBs has been estimated to represent between 90 and 99 per cent (Gravelle 2002).
An important feature of IDB trading is that, although a trade must occur at the last quoted price,
once it has been initiated its size is subject to negotiation if both parties are willing. In addition,
once other IDB participants become aware through the system that a trade has been initiated at a
particular price, they may join in (on either side of the trade) once the trading needs of the original
buyer or seller have been met. This is referred to as the “workup” process, and it continues until
either total buying or selling interest with respect to that trade has been satisﬁed.14 Far from being
an uncommon occurrence, it is quite common for a $2 million quote to eventually result in a trade
of several times the initial posted size.
3. Theoretical Predictions
In this section, we discuss the predictions of several asymmetric information microstructure
models with respect to the behaviour of trading activity, volatility, and liquidity in ﬁnancial
markets around the release of relevant market information. Keep in mind the two different types
of news events examined in this paper: the release of macroeconomic news, and the release of the
results of a Government of Canada bond auction. Although the type of information released to the
public is different, and the sources of asymmetric information may be different, both releases are
scheduled for predetermined times and dates, and both releases of news are nearly instantaneous.
Furthermore, the method in which information is processed, instantaneously and through order
ﬂow or trades, is the same.
Market microstructure models15 generally assume that there are two classes of traders:
uninformed liquidity traders and informed traders. Traders submit orders to a risk-neutral market-
maker who aggregates all orders and clears all trades at a single price. Informed traders have
private information that allows them to proﬁt in their trades with uninformed liquidity traders and
market-makers. To help offset the effects of adverse selection, market-makers reduce liquidity
14. BoniandLeach(2002)provideanexcellentdescriptionofthe“right-of-refusal”limitorderexpansion
protocol.
15. See Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988), Easley and O’Hara(1992), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).9
when the probability of trading against an informed trader is high. Uninformed traders, who
demand liquidity, are hesitant to trade prior to an anticipated event because they fear being
exploited by informed traders.
When the timing of a news release is common knowledge to the market, theory predicts that
liquidity will deteriorate before the release. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) present a model in which
investors actively gather private information prior to a news release, with the intent of proﬁtably
trading on this information. Informed traders in government securities may be better able to
process public information, or they may have access to a larger proportion of market order ﬂow.
The pre-event information-gathering leads to increased informational asymmetry between the
informed and uninformed. Trading volumes may fall prior to the news event because uninformed
traders stay away.
At the news release, price volatility will increase temporarily with the amount of new information
impounded into market prices, representing the revision in investors’ beliefs. Trading volumes
may fall with this uncertainty. As soon as the new information is fully processed by the market,
however, volatility should decline, along with the reduced informational asymmetry in the market.
Afterwards, there may be a period of increased trading volumes and trade and quote activity as
investors rebalance their portfolios. Alternatively, if informed traders trade on their information
prior to the release of news, the impact of the public information when it is released will be
smaller, thereby reducing volatility. The quickness with which the market returns to normal will
indicate how liquid the market is, and how well the market processes new information.
Drudi and Massa (2001) ﬁnd empirical support for a theoretical model in which informed dealers
trade in parallel markets, such as the primary and secondary government securities markets, to
take advantage of differences in transparency across the markets. Traders will place sell orders in
the interdealer secondary market at a time when they have an informational advantage suggesting
higher prices. Concurrently, they will aggressively place bids in the primary market. The strategy
generates losses in the more-transparent market (the secondary market), but larger gains in the
less-transparent market (the primary market). The model predicts increased liquidity prior to the
auction cut-off, as informed traders generate liquidity in the market in an attempt to manipulate
uninformed traders. Once the results of the auction are revealed, there is little disagreement about
the interpretation of the news, so volatility falls. The unwinding of speculative positions or
portfolio rebalancing may be expected to lead to a trade volume surge, but not wider bid/ask
spreads.10
4. Data
Our sample of trade and quote data covers the period from 4 July 2001 to 10 September 2001, and
25 February 2002 to 27 February 2003.16 The CanPX data set is relatively complete, in that it
receives information from all of the Canadian IDBs.17 Dealers leave ﬁrm quotes with the brokers,
along with a minimum size that they are willing to trade. The best quotes across all the
participating dealers are posted. Unlike stock exchanges, dealer behaviour is not governed by
rules that limit bid/ask spreads or price changes, so prices can adjust endogenously.
The following trade and quote information relating to a particular security is available on the
CanPX screen: the price and/or yield of the best bid and offer (if any); the total amount offered
and bid at each of the best inside quotes (across all of the IDB screens); the time at which the best
bid and offer were last updated; whether a buyer-initiated or seller-initiated trade is currently
being conducted; and, when a trade is completed, the trade outcome and the name of the IDB
where the trade took place. Our raw data provide a snapshot of the information on the CanPX
screen, downloaded each time the screen changes. The data contain a signiﬁcant amount of
repetition and a number of data-entry errors. They were ﬁltered prior to performing our
analysis.18
In this study, we focus on benchmark Government of Canada bonds in the 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year
sectors. These securities are the most actively traded and quoted issues on the IDBs. The
benchmark for a given sector is the most recently issued security, with a cumulative issue size
over a certain threshold. The identity of the benchmark bond in each maturity sector changes
periodically, as old securities move out of the maturity sector and new securities are issued to take
their places. This paper follows convention in identifying the benchmarks based on the
Government of Canada’s issuance calendar.
Macroeconomic news announcements and the release of securities auction results occur at
scheduled times. All of the macroeconomic news announcements we consider occur at 8:30 a.m.,
Eastern Standard Time. We use six Canadian news announcements (producer price index (PPI),
real gross domestic product, current account, merchandise trade balance, retail sales, and raw
16. Data for the ﬁve-and-one-half month period immediately following 11 September 2001 are not
available.
17. Overour sample period, the Canadian IDBs included: Freedom International Brokerage Company,
Prebon Yamane(Canada) Ltd., Shorcan Brokers Limited, and Tullett Liberty (Canada) Ltd. The
CanPXdatasetdoesnotincludeinformationontheCanadianIDB“roll”markets,wheredealerstrade
one security for another ona spread basis.
18. The ﬁltering methodology is discussed in D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang (2003).11
materials price index) and nine U.S. economic announcements (non-farm payrolls, CPI, PPI,
unemployment, hourly earnings, trade in goods and services, ﬁnal gross domestic product,
housing starts, and U.S. retail sales).19 There are 199 days with no 8:30 a.m. macroeconomic
announcement and 101 days with one 8:30 a.m. macroeconomic release.
Over the period 4 July 2001 to 8 December 2002, the bidding deadline for Government of Canada
bond auctions was 12:30 p.m. The results of bond auctions were released at 12:45 p.m. during this
period, but starting 9 December 2002, results were announced at 12:40 p.m. Our sample uses 24
auctions, broken down as follows: six 2-year auctions, ﬁve 5-year auctions, eight 10-year
auctions, and ﬁve 30-year auctions.
Our sample consists of just over 14 months of trade and quote data. There are too few 8:30 a.m.
macroeconomic news announcements and too few bond auctions during this period to identify
statistically signiﬁcant effects related to the impact of each type of macroeconomic announcement
or each auction maturity on secondary market dynamics. Therefore, all macroeconomic news
announcements are pooled together and all auctions are pooled across maturities.20 In this paper,
we focus on analyzing how liquidity adjusts when information is revealed to the market, and not
the overall price or yield change.
While we analyze trade and price dynamics on days with and without a news release, we also
contrast differences in dynamics on days with a large news surprise and days with a small news
surprise. It can be argued that dynamics on days that have a small news surprise will reﬂect
anticipated changes in liquidity, whereas the dynamics on days that have a large news surprise
will be representative of anticipated and unanticipated liquidity.
In order to study the effects of large and small macroeconomic surprises on liquidity, we must ﬁrst
calculate the surprise component of each macroeconomic news announcement. Let denote the
median forecast in the Money Market Services (MMS) survey and let denote the release value
for announcement type , in period . The surprise in announcement , in period , is
. Since units of measurement differ across types of economic news
announcements, it is necessary to divide each surprise by the standard deviation of the type of
announcement (calculated using all observations of announcement ). The standardized surprise
measure is . Taking all standardized surprises together (101 announcements in
total), those that are larger than one standard deviation from the mean standardized surprise are
19. The set of news announcements we use is based on the study by F&R.
20. Since benchmarks have been built up and achieve “benchmark” statusonly near the end of the build-
up,mostofthebondswhoseauctionswefocusonarenotthesameasthebondswhosepriceandtrade
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categorized as large macroeconomic surprise announcements (26 of 101),21 and the rest are
categorized as small macroeconomic surprise announcements (75 of 101).
5. Liquidity Measures
In general, a liquid market is one where market participants can rapidly execute large transactions
with only a small impact on prices. Although an exact measure of market liquidity is not
available, it is typically characterized by trading volumes or, if transaction level data are available,
the bid/ask spread. We use a number of statistics that may together provide a meaningful measure
of liquidity. In examining the conditions associated with our two types of events, we consider a
number of variables: volatility, trading volume, trade frequency, quote frequency, bid/ask spreads,
quote size, order expansion, and price-impact coefﬁcients. D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang (2003) ﬁnd
that bid/ask spreads and price-impact coefﬁcients are the most appropriate indicators of liquidity.
Trading volume, or the total value of securities traded per unit of time, is an intuitive and widely
cited measure of market liquidity, stemming from the fact that active markets tend to be more
liquid. The popularity of the measure may reﬂect its simplicity and availability. Theoretical
studies have established a positive link between trading volume and liquidity, suggesting that
higher trading volume is associated with greater market liquidity. However, one drawback of
trading volume as a liquidity indicator is that it is also associated with price volatility (Andersen
1996, Karpoff 1987), which is thought to be negatively related to market liquidity. Trading
volume has shown mixed empirical results as a proxy for market liquidity.
Closely related to trading volume, trade frequency—or the number of trades observed per unit of
time—is another indirect measure of liquidity. Like trading volume, trade frequency may also be
associated with volatility and lower liquidity. The relationship between trading volume and price
changes is muddled by the endogenous nature of trade size, because trade size depends on a
negotiation that depends on the liquidity of the market. When the market is liquid, a dealer may
well be able to execute a large trade at the best quoted price, either because the quoted quantity is
large or because the dealer can negotiate a large quantity. Thus, trading frequency may be more
relevant than trade volume. It does not include any effects from changes in trade size. As a further
measure of market activity, we count the number of non-repeated quotes in each time interval.
This measure is referred to as quote frequency.
21. The mean standardized surprise = -0.0319, and the standard deviation of standardized surprises =
0.6766.13
The bid/ask spread, or the difference between the best bid and offer prices, is a commonly used
measure of market liquidity. It measures directly the costs of executing a small trade, and a market
with very low transaction costs is characterized as liquid. The measure can be calculated quickly
from data that are widely available on a real-time basis. One limitation of the bid/ask spread,
however, is that a spread is good for only a speciﬁc set of bid and ask quote sizes.
Quote size is an appealing proxy for market depth. Often, however, only the inside quotes at the
best bid and ask prices are visible, leaving the rest of the order book effectively invisible to
observers. The quantity that can be traded at the bid and offer prices helps account for the depth of
the market and complements the bid/ask spread as a measure of market liquidity. Unfortunately,
CanPX captures and stores data that relate only to the inside quotes. Furthermore, observed quote
size underestimates true market depth, where participants may actually be willing to transact more
than they explicitly quote. For instance, trades often go through trade expansion, in which a
broker mediates an increase in trade size beyond the amount quoted.
The brokered interdealer government securities markets feature a practice known as trade
expansion, or a “workup.”22 When a quote is “hit” or “lifted,” the workup protocol allows further
negotiations over size to take place. At each stage of the negotiation, each participant retains
right-of-refusal with respect to further size expansion, and trade size will continue to grow until
underlying demand on one side or the other has been met. Furthermore, once the trade has been
initiated, the associated quote begins to ﬂash on the broker’s screen, alerting other participants on
the system that a trade is in progress. Once the initial buyer’s and/or seller’s demand has been
satisﬁed, other dealers are allowed to trade at that price.
One explanation for the use of a workup is that it allows participants to minimize information
leakage with respect to their true trading desires. Instead of posting a large quote (which could
move the market price against them), the dealer posts a small initial quote, subsequently revealing
their true demand only incrementally, and only to the prospective counterparty. As Boni and
Leach (2002) suggest, we might expect participants to make relatively greater use of trade size
expansion under relatively illiquid (or otherwise adverse) market conditions, when concerns
regarding information leakage and stale quotes may be at their highest. We propose two liquidity
measures based on participants’ use of the order expansion protocol: (i) the proportion of total
trades that have undergone size expansion, and (ii) the proportion of total trading volume from
trades that have undergone size expansion.
22. Boni and Leach (2002) provide an excellent description of the right-of-refusal limit order expansion
protocol in the interdealer U.S. Treasury market.14
Kyle (1985) develops a model to address the strategic aspects of informed trading in a market
microstructure model. The model is able to characterize how an informed trader would choose to
transact in order to maximize the value of private information. The price-impact coefﬁcient in the
model reﬂects how much the market adjusts prices to the information content of trades or order
ﬂow. Kyle’s price-impact coefﬁcient can be used to characterize liquidity in ﬁnancial markets
because it is generally believed that liquid markets are those which accommodate trades with the
least impact on prices. The price-impact measure is deﬁned as the slope of the line that relates the
price change to trade size and is typically estimated via a regression. We estimate price impact by
regressing log changes in prices, computed using bid/ask midpoints, on one of two measures of
order ﬂow (OF) over a 5-minute interval:
. (1)
Order ﬂow is measured by the volume of buyer-initiated trades minus the volume of seller-
initiated trades, and the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated
trades over the 5-minute interval. A drawback of this measure is that the data required for
estimation are often difﬁcult to obtain.
6. Statistical Methodology
The event study that we conduct attempts to characterize price and trade dynamics in the
Government of Canada secondary market on days with and without news releases. We examine
intraday price and trade dynamics in the secondary market for Government of Canada securities,
focusing, in particular, on the times just before and just after the release of news. We contrast
“normal” trade and price dynamics, determined on non-event days, with those on event days. The
null hypothesis tested in this paper is that trade and price dynamics are similar on event and non-
event days. To control for intraday seasonal patterns, we use an event study approach.
We determine statistically signiﬁcant differences in liquidity measures on announcement and non-
announcement days, and on auction and non-auction days, using a number of parametric and non-
parametric tests.23 The advantage of using a non-parametric test is that an assumption about the
distribution of each liquidity measure does not have to be made. Table 1 illustrates that the
assumption of normality is violated for all liquidity measures. Brown-Forsythe-modiﬁed Levene
F-statistics are calculated to compare the variance in prices on event and non-event days. Under
the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, or equal variances across samples, the statistic is
23. The appendix provides a detailed explanation of each teststatistic.
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distributed as . The Brown-Forsythe-modiﬁed Levene test is robust against
departures from normality, and does not require equal sample sizes. The Kruskal-Wallis test is
used to test whether there is a statistically signiﬁcant difference between the means of each
liquidity measure on event and non-event days. The test statistic is distributed under the
null hypothesis of equal medians. One of the advantages of non-parametric procedures is that they
are not severely affected by changes in a small proportion of the data (such as the inclusion of an
extreme event). Both parametric and non-parametric tests are documented. After we estimate the
price impacts of signed trades and volumes using equation (1), we calculate F-statistics to test for
differences in the slope coefﬁcients in the two samples.
7. Results
7.1 Volatility
Differences in the average level of volatility on event and non-event days are plotted cumulatively
throughout the day for each benchmark bond in Figures 1 to 8. Cumulative absolute average
returns (CAARs) are calculated by subtracting the absolute return (a measure of volatility) in each
5-minute interval on non-event days from the absolute return on event days. A large positive slope
in the graph reﬂects a large relative increase in volatility on event days. Interestingly, Figures 1 to
8 show a persistent reaction, lasting anywhere from two to four hours, subsequent to both an
8:30 a.m. macroeconomic news release and the release of the results of a Government of Canada
bond auction. Theory suggests that price volatility will increase as information is impounded into
market prices, and it will remain high until a consensus view is reached. It is important to note
that these ﬁgures indicate nothing about the statistical signiﬁcance of the relative levels of
volatility on event and non-event days.
Table 3 documents the average level of volatility for the 2-year benchmark bond in a series of 5-
minute intervals before and after each news release. Time intervals are used to best measure
intraday adjustments in the volatility of prices. The ﬁrst four panels in Tables 3 to 13 relate to
macroeconomic news announcements. Each panel compares two groups of days: Panel 1
compares all days with an 8:30 a.m. news announcement and all days without an 8:30 a.m. news
announcement; Panel 2 compares all days with an 8:30 a.m. large surprise announcement and all
days without an 8:30 a.m. news announcement; Panel 3 compares all days with an 8:30 a.m. small
surprise announcement and all days without an 8:30 a.m. news announcement; Panel 4 compares
all days with an 8:30 a.m. large surprise announcement and all days with an 8:30 a.m. small
surprise announcement. Changes in volatility on small surprise announcement days are, to some
extent, expected by the market. Unexpected changes in volatility, if any, would occur on days with
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a large surprise macroeconomic announcement. At the bottom of Tables 3 to 13 in Panel 5,
average levels of volatility are documented on those days with and without a Government of
Canada bond auction. The same format is used in Tables 3 to 13 to analyze the behaviour of each
liquidity measure for the 2-year benchmark bond.24 In these tables, we document whether any
statistical difference exists between the liquidity measures on event and non-event days. Table 2
summarizes results for the 5-, 10-, and 30-year benchmark bonds. There are many similarities
across bond maturities.
Volatility is signiﬁcantly higher on days of macroeconomic news announcements than non-
announcement days for 20 minutes following the release of news. This amount of time reﬂects
how long it takes for traders in the market, as a group, to adjust their beliefs and form a consensus
view. There is no statistical difference in volatility on large and small macroeconomic surprise
days after the release of news but, interestingly, volatility is higher on large surprise
announcement days in the half-hour that precedes the release.
Dynamics are substantially different around an auction. Volatility is relatively higher just prior to
the release of an auction’s results (or, alternatively, just after the auction cut-off time) and lower in
the ﬁve minutes that follow the release. After that point, there is no signiﬁcant evidence of
relatively higher volatility on auction days, which suggests that market participants are able to
process the publicly released information quickly. The result may also be reﬂective of dealers
trading on their informational advantage prior to release of the auction results. Recall that
informed traders may possess superior information prior to a news event, but that their advantage
is partially or completely ameliorated by the news event.
7.2 Liquidity measures
Average intraday liquidity measures on days with and without macroeconomic news, and on days
with and without government securities auctions, are graphed in Figures 9 to 20. These ﬁgures
indicate persistently higher trade and quote activity following the release of news. Tables 4, 5, and
6 indicate that trading volumes, and trade and quote frequencies, exhibit similar patterns. Each
variable is statistically higher on announcement days during the 5 minutes before, and the 25
minutes following, the release of macroeconomic news. The latter reflects the processing of new
information by market participants. Again, dynamics are quite different on auction days. Trading
volumes, and trade and quote frequencies, are all signiﬁcantly higher on auction days in the 15
minutes prior to the auction cut-off. Informed traders may be attempting to exploit their
24. Similar tables for the 5-, 10-, and 30-year benchmarks are available from the authors.17
informational advantage during this time. All activity variables are signiﬁcantly higher on auction
days in the 20 minutes following the release of the results of an auction. Since volatility is not
signiﬁcantly different during this period, the result points to the unwinding of speculative
positions, or portfolio rebalancing, instead of trading activity based on differences in dealer
views.
Table 7 provides evidence that bid quote sizes are signiﬁcantly lower on announcement days for
the ﬁve minutes that follow the release of macroeconomic news. Table 8 points to ask quote sizes
that are signiﬁcantly lower on announcement days for the 10 minutes before the release of
macroeconomic news, and for the 5 minutes before the auction cut-off. Dealers evidently reduce
the trade size of their quotes in response to inventory risks or the potential for sharp price changes.
It is necessary to focus on a longer time interval than ﬁve minutes to analyze liquidity measures
related to the workup process and the price impact of trades. A 30-minute interval is used, since
more than a few trades are necessary to obtain estimates of these measures. Tables 9 and 10
indicate that there is little difference in the amount of trades, or the proportion of trade volume,
worked up on event and non-event days. This is consistent with the results of D’Souza, Gaa, and
Yang (2003), who ﬁnd that workup measures are not an accurate measure of liquidity in the
market.
In Figure 10, lower bid/ask spreads are shown to persist for more than three hours following the
release of macroeconomic news, whereas, in Figure 16, lower-than-normal bid/ask spreads are
observed prior to the cut-off time of an auction. Spreads widen after the auction cut-off time, and
do not return to normal levels for up to two hours. Table 11 indicates that bid/ask spreads are
statistically higher on announcement days for the ﬁve minutes before and after the release of
macroeconomic news. The wider bid/ask spreads reﬂect dealer reluctance to make markets at a
time when prices may adjust sharply. There is no statistical difference in bid/ask spreads on large
and small macroeconomic surprise days prior to or following the release of news. Spreads are
lower on auction days in the 5 to 10 minutes prior to an auction cut-off. Liquidity will increase if
dealers attempt to exploit their informational advantage prior to the auction cut-off. Bid/ask
spreads are signiﬁcantly higher during the 5 minutes before, and the 10 minutes after, the release
of the auction results. Spreads widen dramatically, driven by inventory-control considerations and
concerns about the presence of informed traders.
Tables 12 and 13 indicate that the price-impact coefﬁcients of net trades and net trading volumes
have nearly identical characteristics. Price-impact coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly higher on
announcement days in the second 30-minute interval following the release of macroeconomic
news. Order ﬂow has a signiﬁcant impact on the prices of all bonds after a macroeconomic release18
or an auction, which suggests that new information is being processed in the market via trading.
Green (2004) also ﬁnds a signiﬁcant increase in the informational role of trading following
economic announcements, suggesting that the release of public information increases the level of
information asymmetry in the government bond market. In the 60 to 90 minutes after the release
of macroeconomic news, price-impact coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly lower on announcement days,
which suggests that, once information is processed, uninformative trading occurs in the market as
traders rebalance their portfolios in light of the newly discovered prices. The price impact of
trades is higher on small vs. large surprise announcement days in the 30 to 60 minutes following
the release of news.
Price-impact coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly higher on auction days in the 30 minutes before and
after the cut-off of an auction. Reduced liquidity arises because of the probability of trading
against an informed trader. The auction not only generates information, but also provides the most
informed dealers a way to operate without revealing their information to other market
participants. This implies that adverse selection should be high, and liquidity accordingly low,
after a news event.
7.3 Summary
In the case of macroeconomic news announcements, a two-stage adjustment process to public
information is observed in the Government of Canada securities market. This ﬁnding is consistent
with asymmetric information interpretations of market liquidity and U.S. empirical evidence. In
the ﬁrst stage, bid/ask spreads widen in the 5-minute interval before and after an announcement.
In an extended second stage, price volatility, trading volumes, and trade and quote activity
increase to higher-than-normal levels following the 8:30 a.m. macroeconomic news release, with
statistically and economically signiﬁcant effects persisting in some cases up to 25 minutes
following the event as dealers begin to take positions based on their differential private views. As
soon as the new information is impounded into prices, volatility declines. A signiﬁcant fall in
price-impact coefﬁcients denotes a possible third stage. After enough time has elapsed for the
market to process the news, liquidity levels surge. Interestingly, we ﬁnd no important differences
in trade and price dynamics between large and small surprise announcement days.
In terms of the price and trade dynamics that surround an auction event, a different three-stage
adjustment occurs. The ﬁrst stage begins in the run-up to the auction cut-off. In this period,
trading volumes and trade and quote activity increase, while bid/ask spreads narrow, consistent
with theory that suggests that informed traders attempt to exploit their order-ﬂow information by
trading aggressively in the market. Traders may also be attempting to manipulate prices in the19
market, as suggested by Drudi and Massa (2001), and, in doing so, they increase liquidity, unlike
macroeconomic news, where any private information related to superior forecasts is probably
already incorporated into prices before the day of the event. Trades just prior to the auction cut-off
reﬂect the arrival of bids from customers. Traders protect themselves from informed trading by
increasing their spreads. Signiﬁcantly higher price-impact coefﬁcients reﬂect the fact that
uninformed traders realize that trades in the market are probably initiated by informed dealers. In
the second stage, just prior to, and after, the release of the auction results, liquidity falls. Judging
by the increase in spreads, dealers are reluctant to make markets when there is the potential for
sharp price changes. The information revealed in the release of the auction results is processed
rapidly by the market, so that, in the third stage, trade and quote activity increase without a
corresponding increase in volatility as traders rebalance their portfolios.
8. Conclusion
While two distinct patterns in price and trade dynamics are documented around the two
information events examined in this paper, they are consistent with theoretical predictions and
U.S. empirical evidence. In particular, we ﬁnd that liquidity varies with the amount of asymmetric
information in the market, and that order ﬂow plays a central role in the processing of
information. Further, Canadian government securities markets react to macroeconomic news
announcements in a manner similar to the highly liquid U.S. Treasury market. In general, we ﬁnd
that news is processed in an efﬁcient and timely manner, which suggests that the quality of the
government securities markets in Canada may be adequate.
Characterizing liquidity dynamics in government securities markets around periods of market
uncertainty is important from a ﬁnancial system perspective, where the promotion of efﬁcient and
resilient ﬁnancial markets is an objective of policy-makers. The ability of markets to process news
quickly and efﬁciently will indicate how these markets would behave when an unexpected shock
arises. The failure of ﬁnancial institutions to take into account changes in market liquidity during
stressful times, and the two-way causality between ﬁnancial market shocks and sharp reductions
in market liquidity, was identiﬁed by the Committee on the Global Financial System,25 of the
G-10 central banks, as a concern regarding ﬁnancial markets. The results of this paper may
contribute to a deeper understanding of ﬁnancial markets, so that policy-makers can act to ensure
robust and efﬁcient ﬁnancial systems.
25. Web site:http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs12.htm.20
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Ask quote size 2236.10
Bid quote size 768.89
(2)=5.99 at the 95 per cent level, (2)=9.2 at the 99 per cent level cc24
















8:30 a.m. macroeconomic news announcement
Table 3 Volatility 2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(large > small)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)








Table 6 Quote frequency 2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
Table 7 Bid quote size 2y, 10y
(lower)
Table 8 Ask quote size 2y, 10y
(lower)
Tables 9 & 10 Order expansion
Table 11 Bid/ask spread 2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
Tables 12 & 13 Price impact  2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(small > large)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(lower)
12:40 or 12:45 p.m. auction release




Table 4 Trading volume 2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
Table 5 Trade frequency 2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
Table 6 Quote frequency 2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
Table 7 Bid quote size
Table 8 Ask quote size 2y
(lower)
Tables 9 & 10 Order expansion
Table 11 Bid/ask spread 2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
Tables 12 & 13 Price impact 2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y
(higher)
2y, 5y, 10y, 30y represent signiﬁcance of test statistics at greater than the 90 per cent level.25
Table 3: 2-Year Benchmark, Volatility
5 minutes ending at: 8:05 8:10 8:15 8:20 8:25 8:30 8:35 8:40 8:45 8:50 8:55 9:00
Panel 1: All announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.025 0.022 0.016 0.013 0.011 0.011
Non-announcement days, mean 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.020 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.008
Ratio of means 0.973 0.900 0.707 1.179 0.715 1.192 1.225 2.215 1.855 1.330 0.987 1.413
Modiﬁed Levene F-statistic 0.100 0.300 1.053 0.051 2.674 0.797 2.546 21.02 18.21 3.513 0.995 2.361
Modiﬁed Levene, p-value 0.752 0.585 0.306 0.822 0.103 0.374 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.320 0.126
Panel 2: Large surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.013
Non-announcement days, mean 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.020 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.008
Ratio of means 1.450 1.248 0.590 1.810 1.091 1.915 0.624 1.708 1.837 1.125 0.859 1.701
Modiﬁed Levene F-statistic 7.117 1.097 0.831 1.287 0.014 2.277 0.029 14.80 8.062 0.000 0.010 3.091
Modiﬁed Levene, p-value 0.008 0.297 0.363 0.258 0.905 0.134 0.866 0.000 0.005 0.994 0.921 0.081
Panel 3: Small surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.029 0.023 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.010
Non-announcement days, mean 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.020 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.008
Ratio of means 0.721 0.752 0.751 0.839 0.518 0.935 1.410 2.317 1.840 1.395 1.033 1.303
Modiﬁed Levene F-statistic 1.339 1.694 0.497 1.172 4.628 0.001 3.291 15.27 16.78 5.149 1.568 1.213
Modiﬁed Levene, p-value 0.249 0.195 0.482 0.280 0.033 0.975 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.212 0.272
Panel 4: Large vs. small surprise announcements
Large announcement days, mean 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.013
Small announcement days, mean 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.029 0.023 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.010
Ratio of means 2.012 1.660 0.786 2.158 2.104 2.049 0.443 0.737 0.999 0.806 0.831 1.305
Modiﬁed Levene F-statistic 14.63 3.605 0.363 2.336 3.436 1.293 0.749 0.004 0.009 1.336 0.941 0.626
Modiﬁed Levene, p-value 0.000 0.061 0.548 0.130 0.068 0.270 0.398 0.949 0.925 0.251 0.335 0.431
Panel 5: Auctions
5 minutes ending at: 12:20 12:25 12:30 12:35 12:40 12:45 12:50 12:55 13:00 13:05 13:10 13:15
Auction days, mean 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.013 0.009 0.002 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.011
Non-auction days, mean 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.007
Ratio of means 0.661 0.686 0.419 2.003 1.001 0.251 1.651 1.145 1.355 1.019 0.606 1.675
Modiﬁed Levene F-statistic 0.049 0.636 2.092 3.016 1.250 2.908 2.051 0.359 3.636 0.315 0.695 3.408
Modiﬁed Levene, p-value 0.825 0.426 0.149 0.084 0.265 0.089 0.153 0.550 0.058 0.575 0.405 0.066
Volatility: Standard deviation in the midpoint of the bid/ask spread over the interval26
Table 4: 2-Year Benchmark, Trading Volume
5 minutes ending at: 8:05 8:10 8:15 8:20 8:25 8:30 8:35 8:40 8:45 8:50 8:55 9:00
Panel 1: All announcements
Announcement days, mean 2.232 6.020 2.071 4.081 6.848 6.192 5.545 15.68 8.712 8.414 10.62 5.657
Non-announcement days, mean 3.352 3.497 4.691 2.509 4.452 5.042 4.139 7.006 5.621 6.939 6.433 6.552
Ratio of means 0.666 1.722 0.441 1.626 1.538 1.228 1.340 2.238 1.550 1.213 1.652 0.863
t-statistic, p-value 0.396 0.241 0.143 0.268 0.124 0.529 0.362 0.004 0.134 0.573 0.083 0.711
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.729 0.979 0.452 0.975 0.498 0.029 0.061 0.000 0.004 0.032 0.025 0.304
Panel 2: Large surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 5.308 12.07 1.462 0.962 3.269 5.231 7.885 22.44 7.615 6.577 6.385 5.192
Non-announcement days, mean 3.352 3.497 4.691 2.509 4.452 5.042 4.139 7.006 5.621 6.939 6.433 6.552
Ratio of means 1.584 3.454 0.312 0.383 0.734 1.037 1.905 3.203 1.355 0.948 0.992 0.793
t-statistic, p-value 0.436 0.023 0.336 0.342 0.590 0.950 0.165 0.002 0.524 0.935 0.988 0.757
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.436 0.691 0.956 0.312 0.355 0.320 0.398 0.000 0.007 0.591 0.734 0.197
Panel 3: Small surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 1.137 3.863 2.288 5.192 8.123 6.534 4.712 13.27 9.103 9.068 12.13 5.822
Non-announcement days, mean 3.352 3.497 4.691 2.509 4.452 5.042 4.139 7.006 5.621 6.939 6.433 6.552
Ratio of means 0.339 1.105 0.488 2.069 1.825 1.296 1.138 1.895 1.620 1.307 1.887 0.889
t-statistic, p-value 0.102 0.838 0.248 0.101 0.035 0.467 0.720 0.038 0.141 0.477 0.038 0.792
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.387 0.854 0.338 0.630 0.195 0.029 0.063 0.000 0.031 0.018 0.010 0.559
Panel 4: Large vs. small surprise announcements
Large announcement days, mean 5.308 12.07 1.462 0.962 3.269 5.231 7.885 22.44 7.615 6.577 6.385 5.192
Small announcement days, mean 1.137 3.863 2.288 5.192 8.123 6.534 4.712 13.27 9.103 9.068 12.13 5.822
Ratio of means 4.668 3.126 0.639 0.185 0.402 0.801 1.673 1.691 0.837 0.725 0.526 0.892
t-statistic, p-value 0.036 0.113 0.590 0.214 0.154 0.680 0.274 0.148 0.710 0.544 0.279 0.833
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.183 0.622 0.512 0.233 0.128 0.659 0.783 0.110 0.335 0.404 0.223 0.428
Panel 5: Auctions
5 minutes ending at: 12:20 12:25 12:30 12:35 12:40 12:45 12:50 12:55 13:00 13:05 13:10 13:15
Auction days, mean 11.08 6.458 1.417 3.208 0.417 1.292 2.833 6.792 1.750 5.250 1.708 6.000
Non-auction days, mean 2.242 1.863 2.657 3.303 1.967 2.624 3.539 2.834 3.328 2.996 3.347 2.542
Ratio of means 4.943 3.466 0.533 0.971 0.212 0.492 0.801 2.397 0.526 1.752 0.510 2.360
t-statistic, p-value 0.000 0.003 0.517 0.974 0.195 0.486 0.798 0.072 0.632 0.454 0.449 0.146
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.011 0.001 0.721 0.317 0.847 0.495 0.817 0.010 0.575 0.032 0.785 0.231
Trading volume, or the total value of securities traded per unit of time27
Table 5: 2-Year Benchmark, Trade Frequency
5 minutes ending at: 8:05 8:10 8:15 8:20 8:25 8:30 8:35 8:40 8:45 8:50 8:55 9:00
Panel 1: All announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.232 0.222 0.253 0.232 0.455 0.566 0.626 1.152 0.808 0.818 0.788 0.475
Non-announcement days, mean 0.261 0.279 0.291 0.261 0.442 0.418 0.388 0.448 0.430 0.473 0.539 0.382
Ratio of means 0.891 0.797 0.868 0.891 1.027 1.353 1.615 2.568 1.878 1.731 1.461 1.243
t-statistic, p-value 0.687 0.433 0.623 0.694 0.906 0.197 0.022 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.033 0.403
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.833 0.827 0.489 0.884 0.673 0.030 0.059 0.000 0.002 0.020 0.013 0.311
Panel 2: Large surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.385 0.269 0.269 0.231 0.308 0.500 0.538 1.192 0.923 0.615 0.615 0.462
Non-announcement days, mean 0.261 0.279 0.291 0.261 0.442 0.418 0.388 0.448 0.430 0.473 0.539 0.382
Ratio of means 1.476 0.966 0.925 0.886 0.695 1.196 1.388 2.659 2.145 1.302 1.141 1.209
t-statistic, p-value 0.321 0.941 0.865 0.814 0.436 0.669 0.327 0.000 0.004 0.418 0.690 0.626
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.374 0.823 0.941 0.403 0.395 0.315 0.519 0.000 0.003 0.553 0.757 0.184
Panel 3: Small surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.178 0.205 0.247 0.233 0.507 0.589 0.658 1.137 0.767 0.890 0.849 0.479
Non-announcement days, mean 0.261 0.279 0.291 0.261 0.442 0.418 0.388 0.448 0.430 0.473 0.539 0.382
Ratio of means 0.683 0.737 0.848 0.894 1.146 1.409 1.695 2.535 1.783 1.884 1.575 1.256
t-statistic, p-value 0.270 0.362 0.613 0.719 0.577 0.183 0.017 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.015 0.439
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.449 0.696 0.371 0.798 0.342 0.030 0.047 0.000 0.023 0.011 0.004 0.584
Panel 4: Large vs. small surprise announcements
Large announcement days, mean 0.385 0.269 0.269 0.231 0.308 0.500 0.538 1.192 0.923 0.615 0.615 0.462
Small announcement days, mean 0.178 0.205 0.247 0.233 0.507 0.589 0.658 1.137 0.767 0.890 0.849 0.479
Ratio of means 2.160 1.310 1.092 0.991 0.607 0.849 0.819 1.049 1.203 0.691 0.725 0.963
t-statistic, p-value 0.077 0.550 0.872 0.986 0.253 0.648 0.599 0.871 0.525 0.324 0.289 0.938
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.186 0.640 0.507 0.332 0.188 0.703 0.547 0.381 0.277 0.351 0.147 0.392
Panel 5: Auctions
5 minutes ending at: 12:20 12:25 12:30 12:35 12:40 12:45 12:50 12:55 13:00 13:05 13:10 13:15
Auction days, mean 0.500 0.583 0.167 0.333 0.208 0.167 0.292 0.583 0.208 0.542 0.208 0.458
Non-auction days, mean 0.244 0.218 0.255 0.251 0.262 0.266 0.284 0.221 0.232 0.210 0.292 0.236
Ratio of means 2.053 2.679 0.655 1.328 0.795 0.627 1.027 2.635 0.896 2.575 0.715 1.941
t-statistic, p-value 0.061 0.001 0.502 0.576 0.661 0.392 0.961 0.004 0.852 0.007 0.520 0.074
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.020 0.001 0.740 0.268 0.996 0.526 0.741 0.009 0.600 0.024 0.735 0.140
Trade frequency: the number of trades observed per unit of time28
Table 6: 2-Year Benchmark, Quote Frequency
5 minutes ending at: 8:05 8:10 8:15 8:20 8:25 8:30 8:35 8:40 8:45 8:50 8:55 9:00
Panel 1: All announcements
Announcement days, mean 3.707 3.970 4.495 4.010 5.303 6.707 12.12 12.74 11.40 9.131 9.414 7.707
Non-announcement days, mean 4.042 4.139 4.842 4.648 6.018 6.267 8.279 7.497 7.000 6.073 6.812 6.479
Ratio of means 0.917 0.959 0.928 0.863 0.881 1.070 1.464 1.700 1.629 1.504 1.382 1.190
t-statistic, p-value 0.556 0.793 0.560 0.257 0.334 0.592 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.120
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.584 0.213 0.713 0.190 0.888 0.431 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.193
Panel 2: Large surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 4.808 4.346 4.692 4.000 5.500 6.846 9.654 13.42 9.846 8.000 7.769 7.462
Non-announcement days, mean 4.042 4.139 4.842 4.648 6.018 6.267 8.279 7.497 7.000 6.073 6.812 6.479
Ratio of means 1.189 1.050 0.969 0.860 0.914 1.092 1.166 1.790 1.407 1.317 1.141 1.152
t-statistic, p-value 0.458 0.860 0.884 0.488 0.695 0.661 0.417 0.000 0.032 0.120 0.487 0.412
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.228 0.398 0.664 0.662 0.971 0.274 0.457 0.004 0.004 0.374 0.672 0.445
Panel 3: Small surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 3.315 3.836 4.425 4.014 5.233 6.658 13.00 12.50 11.95 9.534 10.00 7.795
Non-announcement days, mean 4.042 4.139 4.842 4.648 6.018 6.267 8.279 7.497 7.000 6.073 6.812 6.479
Ratio of means 0.820 0.927 0.914 0.863 0.870 1.062 1.570 1.668 1.708 1.570 1.468 1.203
t-statistic, p-value 0.247 0.675 0.522 0.316 0.343 0.673 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.132
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.979 0.282 0.827 0.170 0.879 0.703 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.235
Panel 4: Large vs. small surprise announcements
Large announcement days, mean 4.808 4.346 4.692 4.000 5.500 6.846 9.654 13.42 9.846 8.000 7.769 7.462
Small announcement days, mean 3.315 3.836 4.425 4.014 5.233 6.658 13.00 12.50 11.95 9.534 10.00 7.795
Ratio of means 1.450 1.133 1.060 0.997 1.051 1.028 0.743 1.073 0.823 0.839 0.777 0.957
t-statistic, p-value 0.068 0.550 0.791 0.989 0.804 0.900 0.141 0.679 0.279 0.498 0.219 0.838
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.197 0.860 0.801 0.560 0.971 0.432 0.096 0.845 0.449 0.349 0.084 0.997
Panel 5: Auctions
5 minutes ending at: 12:20 12:25 12:30 12:35 12:40 12:45 12:50 12:55 13:00 13:05 13:10 13:15
Auction days, mean 5.500 4.375 2.708 2.667 3.667 2.042 5.292 6.667 6.708 6.375 5.625 4.917
Non-auction days, mean 4.041 3.697 3.745 3.849 4.177 3.775 4.240 4.103 3.911 3.989 4.362 4.007
Ratio of means 1.361 1.183 0.723 0.693 0.878 0.541 1.248 1.625 1.715 1.598 1.290 1.227
t-statistic, p-value 0.136 0.446 0.220 0.167 0.602 0.039 0.322 0.022 0.009 0.014 0.245 0.399
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.037 0.845 0.370 0.312 0.915 0.014 0.439 0.008 0.001 0.005 0.329 0.278
Quote frequency: the number of quotes observed per unit of time29
Table 7: 2-Year Benchmark, Bid Size
5 minutes ending at: 8:05 8:10 8:15 8:20 8:25 8:30 8:35 8:40 8:45 8:50 8:55 9:00
Panel 1: All announcements
Announcement days, mean 3.241 3.604 3.567 4.023 3.193 2.364 3.386 3.753 3.449 4.711 3.489 3.420
Non-announcement days, mean 3.557 3.986 3.643 3.633 3.924 3.351 3.858 4.438 4.503 4.688 4.630 4.079
Ratio of means 0.911 0.904 0.979 1.107 0.814 0.705 0.878 0.846 0.766 1.005 0.754 0.838
t-statistic, p-value 0.488 0.576 0.905 0.482 0.226 0.189 0.546 0.559 0.196 0.987 0.212 0.218
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.969 0.742 0.084 0.007 0.524 0.163 0.054 0.454 0.137 0.114 0.128 0.075
Panel 2: Large surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 2.818 2.708 3.250 3.500 3.217 3.000 2.591 3.917 3.167 3.125 3.087 2.619
Non-announcement days, mean 3.557 3.986 3.643 3.633 3.924 3.351 3.858 4.438 4.503 4.688 4.630 4.079
Ratio of means 0.792 0.679 0.892 0.963 0.820 0.895 0.672 0.883 0.703 0.667 0.667 0.642
t-statistic, p-value 0.349 0.278 0.717 0.878 0.531 0.807 0.286 0.797 0.387 0.438 0.365 0.126
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.467 0.483 0.048 0.042 0.425 0.585 0.087 0.709 0.486 0.381 0.566 0.044
Panel 3: Small surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 3.385 3.925 3.682 4.219 3.183 2.125 3.672 3.689 3.537 5.288 3.627 3.672
Non-announcement days, mean 3.557 3.986 3.643 3.633 3.924 3.351 3.858 4.438 4.503 4.688 4.630 4.079
Ratio of means 0.951 0.985 1.011 1.161 0.811 0.634 0.952 0.831 0.785 1.128 0.783 0.900
t-statistic, p-value 0.740 0.939 0.959 0.364 0.295 0.163 0.838 0.582 0.299 0.718 0.342 0.503
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.671 0.443 0.276 0.023 0.731 0.043 0.159 0.473 0.152 0.144 0.119 0.261
Panel 4: Large vs. small surprise announcements
Large announcement days, mean 2.818 2.708 3.250 3.500 3.217 3.000 2.591 3.917 3.167 3.125 3.087 2.619
Small announcement days, mean 3.385 3.925 3.682 4.219 3.183 2.125 3.672 3.689 3.537 5.288 3.627 3.672
Ratio of means 0.833 0.690 0.883 0.830 1.011 1.412 0.706 1.062 0.895 0.591 0.851 0.713
t-statistic, p-value 0.407 0.187 0.635 0.451 0.926 0.027 0.464 0.880 0.707 0.443 0.543 0.196
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.360 0.234 0.271 0.812 0.611 0.021 0.427 0.945 0.928 0.908 0.577 0.241
Panel 5: Auctions
5 minutes ending at: 12:20 12:25 12:30 12:35 12:40 12:45 12:50 12:55 13:00 13:05 13:10 13:15
Auction days, mean 3.826 2.800 2.611 2.444 3.632 3.812 3.850 5.696 7.000 2.842 3.750 19.28
Non-auction days, mean 3.519 3.729 4.328 3.449 3.912 3.711 4.022 4.006 4.477 4.716 5.054 4.193
Ratio of means 1.087 0.751 0.603 0.709 0.928 1.027 0.957 1.422 1.563 0.603 0.742 4.600
t-statistic, p-value 0.759 0.475 0.416 0.290 0.831 0.938 0.905 0.345 0.251 0.409 0.619 0.000
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.404 0.943 0.432 0.109 0.131 0.137 0.873 0.680 0.895 0.371 0.711 0.524
Bid quote size: average amount posted at the best bid prices in interval30
Table 8: 2-Year Benchmark, Ask Size
5 minutes ending at: 8:05 8:10 8:15 8:20 8:25 8:30 8:35 8:40 8:45 8:50 8:55 9:00
Panel 1: All announcements
Announcement days, mean 3.241 3.330 3.367 3.205 2.627 2.455 2.843 3.271 4.705 3.422 4.733 4.465
Non-announcement days, mean 3.436 3.496 3.266 3.560 4.034 5.518 5.255 3.861 4.879 4.319 4.519 4.052
Ratio of means 0.943 0.952 1.031 0.900 0.651 0.445 0.541 0.847 0.964 0.792 1.047 1.102
Modiﬁed Levene statistic 0.618 0.734 0.841 0.462 0.023 0.445 0.198 0.204 0.870 0.220 0.830 0.710
Modiﬁed Levene, p-value 0.727 0.687 0.919 0.453 0.006 0.042 0.154 0.246 0.852 0.109 0.283 0.390
Panel 2: Large surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 2.864 2.875 4.250 3.875 2.783 2.833 2.955 2.583 3.190 2.792 3.043 2.810
Non-announcement days, mean 3.436 3.496 3.266 3.560 4.034 5.518 5.255 3.861 4.879 4.319 4.519 4.052
Ratio of means 0.833 0.822 1.301 1.088 0.690 0.514 0.562 0.669 0.654 0.646 0.673 0.693
t-statistic, p-value 0.364 0.397 0.243 0.727 0.279 0.727 0.527 0.106 0.339 0.219 0.317 0.314
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.558 0.974 0.121 0.433 0.356 0.641 0.358 0.069 0.489 0.240 0.492 0.349
Panel 3: Small surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 3.369 3.493 3.045 2.953 2.567 2.312 2.803 3.541 5.179 3.652 5.313 4.984
Non-announcement days, mean 3.436 3.496 3.266 3.560 4.034 5.518 5.255 3.861 4.879 4.319 4.519 4.052
Ratio of means 0.981 0.999 0.933 0.830 0.636 0.419 0.533 0.917 1.061 0.845 1.176 1.230
t-statistic, p-value 0.881 0.995 0.667 0.215 0.043 0.495 0.262 0.556 0.806 0.433 0.491 0.463
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.902 0.607 0.462 0.625 0.004 0.031 0.214 0.682 0.904 0.185 0.342 0.570
Panel 4: Large vs. small surprise announcements
Large announcement days, mean 2.864 2.875 4.250 3.875 2.783 2.833 2.955 2.583 3.190 2.792 3.043 2.810
Small announcement days, mean 3.369 3.493 3.045 2.953 2.567 2.312 2.803 3.541 5.179 3.652 5.313 4.984
Ratio of means 0.850 0.823 1.396 1.312 1.084 1.225 1.054 0.730 0.616 0.765 0.573 0.564
t-statistic, p-value 0.465 0.497 0.230 0.241 0.509 0.293 0.707 0.113 0.308 0.408 0.224 0.443
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.639 0.708 0.067 0.725 0.216 0.273 0.911 0.163 0.532 0.795 0.974 0.596
Panel 5: Auctions
5 minutes ending at: 12:20 12:25 12:30 12:35 12:40 12:45 12:50 12:55 13:00 13:05 13:10 13:15
Auction days, mean 3.826 2.500 2.222 2.278 2.474 4.312 4.350 8.348 2.583 2.947 2.750 2.862
Non-auction days, mean 4.182 3.748 3.469 3.577 3.627 4.106 3.991 3.532 3.492 3.494 3.427 4.543
Ratio of means 0.915 0.667 0.641 0.637 0.682 1.050 1.090 2.364 0.740 0.844 0.802 0.630
t-statistic, p-value 0.851 0.465 0.217 0.306 0.387 0.907 0.784 0.004 0.264 0.553 0.499 0.401
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.885 0.313 0.035 0.099 0.398 0.803 0.184 0.018 0.506 0.802 0.976 0.217
Ask quote size: average amount posted at the best ask prices in interval31
Table 9: 2-Year Benchmark, Workup 1
30 minutes ending at: 8:00 8:30 9:00 9:30 10:00
Panel 1: All announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.587 0.621 0.466 0.450 0.425
Non-announcement days, mean 0.502 0.474 0.453 0.478 0.381
Ratio of means 1.168 1.310 1.030 0.941 1.114
t-statistic, p-value 0.506 0.069 0.809 0.542 0.373
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.522 0.118 0.905 0.638 0.289
Panel 2: Large surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.531 0.550 0.461 0.538 0.367
Non-announcement days, mean 0.502 0.474 0.453 0.478 0.381
Ratio of means 1.056 1.161 1.018 1.124 0.962
t-statistic, p-value 0.880 0.565 0.932 0.459 0.857
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.915 0.667 0.912 0.412 0.892
Panel 3: Small surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.611 0.648 0.468 0.420 0.448
Non-announcement days, mean 0.502 0.474 0.453 0.478 0.381
Ratio of means 1.217 1.369 1.034 0.878 1.176
t-statistic, p-value 0.443 0.054 0.805 0.260 0.222
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.439 0.088 0.929 0.320 0.158
Panel 4: Large vs. small surprise announcements
Large announcement days, mean 0.531 0.550 0.461 0.538 0.367
Small announcement days, mean 0.611 0.648 0.468 0.420 0.448
Ratio of means 0.868 0.848 0.984 1.280 0.818
t-statistic, p-value 0.676 0.469 0.947 0.113 0.311
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.578 0.391 0.995 0.112 0.300
Panel 5: Auctions
30 minutes ending at: 11:30 12:00 12:30 13:00 13:30
Announcement days, mean 0.316 0.457 0.544 0.423 0.332
Non-announcement days, mean 0.419 0.426 0.444 0.427 0.437
Ratio of means 0.755 1.073 1.226 0.993 0.761
t-statistic, p-value 0.186 0.713 0.286 0.974 0.289
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.231 0.682 0.292 0.962 0.373
Workup 1: proportion of total trades that have undergone size expansion in interval32
Table 10: 2-Year Benchmark, Workup 2
30 minutes ending at: 8:00 8:30 9:00 9:30 10:00
Panel 1: All announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.680 0.683 0.613 0.633 0.605
Non-announcement days, mean 0.615 0.540 0.572 0.640 0.517
Ratio of means 1.107 1.264 1.073 0.988 1.169
t-statistic, p-value 0.621 0.087 0.509 0.886 0.142
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.741 0.185 0.365 0.360 0.370
Panel 2: Large surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.606 0.641 0.659 0.767 0.536
Non-announcement days, mean 0.615 0.540 0.572 0.640 0.517
Ratio of means 0.986 1.188 1.154 1.198 1.035
t-statistic, p-value 0.965 0.461 0.404 0.143 0.850
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.751 0.719 0.503 0.354 0.886
Panel 3: Small surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 0.713 0.699 0.599 0.587 0.633
Non-announcement days, mean 0.615 0.540 0.572 0.640 0.517
Ratio of means 1.160 1.295 1.048 0.917 1.223
t-statistic, p-value 0.508 0.089 0.687 0.359 0.083
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.536 0.146 0.446 0.111 0.226
Panel 4: Large vs. small surprise announcements
Large announcement days, mean 0.606 0.641 0.659 0.767 0.536
Small announcement days, mean 0.713 0.699 0.599 0.587 0.633
Ratio of means 0.850 0.917 1.100 1.306 0.846
t-statistic, p-value 0.592 0.683 0.623 0.035 0.320
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.348 0.443 0.958 0.027 0.344
Panel 5: Auctions
30 minutes ending at: 11:30 12:00 12:30 13:00 13:30
Announcement days, mean 0.599 0.602 0.694 0.541 0.468
Non-announcement days, mean 0.569 0.545 0.566 0.530 0.530
Ratio of means 1.053 1.104 1.226 1.022 0.884
t-statistic, p-value 0.744 0.549 0.225 0.912 0.576
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.786 0.653 0.307 0.949 0.340
Workup 2: the proportion of total trading volume from trades that have undergone size expansion in interval33
Table 11: 2-Year Benchmark, Bid/Ask Spread
5 minutes ending at: 8:05 8:10 8:15 8:20 8:25 8:30 8:35 8:40 8:45 8:50 8:55 9:00
Panel 1: All announcements
Announcement days, mean 1.396 1.454 1.277 1.313 1.236 2.007 1.789 1.479 1.222 1.202 1.330 1.249
Non-announcement days, mean 1.492 1.477 1.415 1.465 1.409 1.425 1.586 1.362 1.198 1.210 1.222 1.226
Ratio of means 0.936 0.984 0.903 0.896 0.877 1.409 1.128 1.086 1.020 0.993 1.089 1.019
t-statistic, p-value 0.467 0.842 0.240 0.220 0.123 0.005 0.190 0.341 0.814 0.944 0.441 0.861
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.894 0.974 0.554 0.109 0.225 0.037 0.040 0.198 0.745 0.442 0.106 0.711
Panel 2: Large surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 1.463 1.413 1.397 1.509 1.239 1.655 1.716 1.287 1.344 1.178 1.477 1.314
Non-announcement days, mean 1.492 1.477 1.415 1.465 1.409 1.425 1.586 1.362 1.198 1.210 1.222 1.226
Ratio of means 0.980 0.957 0.988 1.030 0.879 1.161 1.082 0.945 1.122 0.974 1.209 1.072
t-statistic, p-value 0.903 0.746 0.931 0.835 0.363 0.504 0.622 0.687 0.395 0.867 0.268 0.689
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.589 0.835 0.508 0.934 0.827 0.622 0.257 0.712 0.236 0.751 0.075 0.829
Panel 3: Small surprise announcements
Announcement days, mean 1.374 1.468 1.234 1.239 1.235 2.139 1.815 1.555 1.184 1.211 1.280 1.228
Non-announcement days, mean 1.492 1.477 1.415 1.465 1.409 1.425 1.586 1.362 1.198 1.210 1.222 1.226
Ratio of means 0.921 0.994 0.872 0.846 0.877 1.502 1.144 1.142 0.989 1.001 1.048 1.002
t-statistic, p-value 0.422 0.946 0.170 0.085 0.175 0.003 0.189 0.175 0.905 0.995 0.712 0.987
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.659 0.879 0.277 0.053 0.167 0.027 0.056 0.163 0.843 0.437 0.289 0.736
Panel 4: Large vs. small surprise announcements
Large announcement days, mean 1.463 1.413 1.397 1.509 1.239 1.655 1.716 1.287 1.344 1.178 1.477 1.314
Small announcement days, mean 1.374 1.468 1.234 1.239 1.235 2.139 1.815 1.555 1.184 1.211 1.280 1.228
Ratio of means 1.065 0.963 1.133 1.217 1.003 0.773 0.946 0.827 1.135 0.973 1.154 1.070
t-statistic, p-value 0.636 0.776 0.347 0.231 0.983 0.379 0.694 0.238 0.442 0.858 0.415 0.731
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.364 0.804 0.198 0.253 0.590 0.302 0.718 0.488 0.177 0.938 0.311 0.992
Panel 5: Auctions
5 minutes ending at: 12:20 12:25 12:30 12:35 12:40 12:45 12:50 12:55 13:00 13:05 13:10 13:15
Auction days, mean 1.125 1.028 1.216 1.290 1.674 1.420 1.669 1.623 1.212 1.129 1.338 1.657
Non-auction days, mean 1.479 1.432 1.385 1.445 1.449 1.407 1.420 1.406 1.331 1.355 1.339 1.344
Ratio of means 0.761 0.718 0.878 0.893 1.155 1.009 1.176 1.154 0.910 0.833 0.999 1.233
t-statistic, p-value 0.371 0.296 0.675 0.697 0.575 0.977 0.534 0.553 0.731 0.563 0.997 0.406
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value 0.155 0.021 0.337 0.837 0.091 0.329 0.094 0.033 0.875 0.570 0.854 0.437
Bid/ask spread: the average difference between the best bid and offer prices in each time interval34
Table 12: 2-Year Benchmark, Kyle 1
30 minutes ending at: 8:00 8:30 9:00 9:30 10:00
Panel 1: All announcements
Announcement days, coef. 0.508 0.614 0.132 0.632 0.191
p-value 0.000 0.035 0.362 0.000 0.016
Non-announcement days, coef. 0.732 0.426 0.553 0.342 0.565
p-value 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value, F-stat, diff. in slope 0.116 0.550 0.020 0.002 0.002
Panel 2: Large surprise announcements
Announcement days, coef. 0.507 -0.193 1.477 0.336 0.332
p-value 0.000 0.573 0.075 0.004 0.000
Non-Announcement days, coef. 0.732 0.426 0.553 0.342 0.565
p-value 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value, F-stat, diff. in slope 0.164 0.879 0.096 0.339 0.228
Panel 3: Small surprise announcements
Announcement days, coef. 0.492 0.607 -0.116 0.751 0.317
p-value 0.003 0.044 0.677 0.000 0.000
Non-announcement days, coef. 0.732 0.426 0.553 0.342 0.565
p-value 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value, F-stat, diff. in slope 0.186 0.470 0.011 0.000 0.089
Panel 4: Large vs. small surprise announcements
Large announcement days, coef. 0.507 -0.193 1.477 0.336 0.332
p-value 0.000 0.573 0.075 0.004 0.000
Small announcement days, coef. 0.492 0.607 -0.116 0.751 0.317
p-value 0.003 0.044 0.677 0.000 0.000
p-value, F-stat, diff. in slope 0.437 0.016 0.110 0.026 0.923
Panel 5: Auctions
30 minutes ending at: 11:30 12:00 12:30 13:00 13:30
Auction days, coef. 0.298 0.446 0.988 1.020 0.309
p-value 0.022 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.000
Non-auction days, coef. 0.542 0.410 0.603 0.442 -3.417
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.805
p-value, F-stat, diff. in slope 0.059 0.229 0.005 0.004 0.608
Kyle 1: estimate price impact by regressing log changes in price on net trading activity over interval. Net trading activity is the volume of buyer-initi-
ated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades over the interval.35
Table 13: 2-Year Benchmark, Kyle 2
30 minutes ending at: 8:00 8:30 9:00 9:30 10:00
Panel 1: All announcements
Announcement days, coef. 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.024 0.006
p-value 0.003 0.397 0.161 0.002 0.051
Non-announcement days, coef. 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.010 0.020
p-value 0.000 0.139 0.002 0.002 0.040
p-value, F-stat, diff. in slope 0.351 0.559 0.151 0.017 0.061
Panel 2: Large surprise announcements
Announcement days, coef. 0.028 0.016 0.073 0.011 0.005
p-value 0.027 0.030 0.001 0.013 0.258
Non-announcement days, coef. 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.010 0.020
p-value 0.000 0.139 0.002 0.002 0.040
p-value, F-stat, diff. in slope 0.381 0.856 0.051 0.262 0.441
Panel 3: Small surprise announcements
Announcement days, coef. 0.008 -0.002 0.005 0.031 0.010
p-value 0.002 0.529 0.291 0.007 0.004
Non-announcement days, coef. 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.010 0.020
p-value 0.000 0.139 0.002 0.002 0.040
p-value, F-stat, diff. in slope 0.205 0.461 0.099 0.002 0.257
Panel 4: Large vs. small surprise announcements
Large announcement days, coef. 0.028 0.016 0.073 0.011 0.005
p-value 0.027 0.030 0.001 0.013 0.258
Small announcement days, coef. 0.008 -0.002 0.005 0.031 0.010
p-value 0.002 0.529 0.291 0.007 0.004
p-value, F-stat, diff. in slope 0.104 0.010 0.033 0.039 0.561
Panel 5: Auctions
30 minutes ending at: 11:30 12:00 12:30 13:00 13:30
Auction days, coef. 0.008 0.014 0.023 0.061 0.025
p-value 0.152 0.111 0.034 0.023 0.000
Non-auction days, coef. 0.014 0.014 0.032 0.015 -0.092
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.782
p-value, F-stat, diff. in slope 0.005 0.164 0.007 0.002 0.717
Kyle 2: estimate price impact by regressing log changes in price on net trading activity over interval. Net trading activity is the number of buyer-initi-
ated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades over the interval.36
Figure 2: 8:30 a.m. Announcement,
5-Year Benchmark, CAAR*














Figure 3: 8:30 a.m. Announcement,
10-Year Benchmark, CAAR*













Figure 4: 8:30 a.m. Announcement,
30-Year Benchmark, CAAR*









5-minute interval on non-event days from the absolute return on event days. Results are plotted
cumulatively throughout the day.
Figure 1: 8:30 a.m. Announcement,
2-Year Benchmark, CAAR*












Figure 6: Bond Auction, 5-Year
Benchmark, CAAR*













Figure 7: Bond Auction, 10-Year
Benchmark, CAAR*










Figure 8: Bond Auction, 30-Year
Benchmark, CAAR*













5-minute interval on non-event days from the absolute return on event days. Results are plotted
cumulatively throughout the day.
Figure 5: Bond Auction, 2-Year
Benchmark, CAAR*










Figure 10: 8:30 a.m. Announcement, 2-Year
Benchmark, Bid/Ask Spread












Figure 11: 8:30 a.m. Announcement, 2-Year
Benchmark, Trade Frequency












Figure 12: 8:30 a.m. Announcement, 2-Year
Benchmark, Quote Frequency












Figure 9: 8:30 a.m. Announcement, 2-Year
Benchmark, Trading Volume













Figure 14: 8:30 a.m. Announcement, 2-Year
Benchmark, Ask Size












Figure 15: Bond Auction, 2-Year
Benchmark, Trading Volume












Figure 16: Bond Auction, 2-Year
Benchmark, Bid/Ask Spread












Figure 13: 8:30 a.m. Announcement, 2-Year
Benchmark, Bid Size













Figure 18: Bond Auction, 2-Year
Benchmark, Quote Frequency











Figure 19: Bond Auction, 2-Year
Benchmark, Bid Size















Figure 20: Bond Auction, 2-Year
Benchmark, Ask Size














Figure 17: Bond Auction, 2-Year
Benchmark, Trade Frequency















A normal distribution with variance  has a third central moment (skewness) that is zero, and a
fourth central moment (kurtosis) that is . To test whether the distribution of a variable is
normal, an LM statistic is constructed (see Davidson and MacKinnon 1993):
, (A1)
where normalized observations are calculated as
. (A2)
The LM statistic is distributed .




and  is the return for day  and interval ,  is the sample median;  is the number of
observations in the sample of interval . Brown-Forsythe-modiﬁed Levene F-statistics are
calculated to compare variances in returns on days with and without macroeconomic news
announcements and securities auctions. Under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity across
sample groups, the statistic is distributed as . The test is robust against departures
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observations in each sample from the sample median, and then evaluates whether the means of
these deviations are equal for all samples.
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a non-parametric test for comparing the means of two series. More
speciﬁcally, it is used to test whether there is a statistically signiﬁcant difference between the
means of two series, such as bid/ask spreads on event and non-event days. The test statistic is
, (A5)
where is the number of series (equal to 2: event and non-event series); is the total number of
observations from both series combined;  is the number of observations from series ; and
is the ranksum for series . The test statistic is distributed  under the null hypothesis of
equal medians. If the p-value for the null hypothesis that all samples are drawn from the same
population (or from different populations with the same mean) is near zero, this suggests that at
least one sample mean is signiﬁcantly different from the other sample mean. One of the
advantages of non-parametric procedures is that they are not severely affected by changes in a
small proportion of the data (such as the inclusion of an extreme event).
After estimating the price impacts of signed trades and volumes using equation (1), an F-statistic
testing the restriction that the slope coefﬁcients in the two samples are the same is calculated:
, (A6)
where , and , calculated from a regression on the pooled results, is the
sample size of sample , and  is equal to the number of regressors.
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